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EXPECTATION, ADAPTATION, AND RESIGNATION
British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914–April 1916
Jon Tetsuro Sumida

I

n mid-July 1914, a trial mobilization of the active and reserve warships of the
Royal Navy, which had been planned the previous fall, put virtually all of Britain’s effective naval forces on a war footing. This event coincided with the increasingly rancorous great-power dispute precipitated by the Balkans crisis. The
deteriorating European political situation prompted the Admiralty to delay the
dispersal of the bulk of the fleet after the conclusion of the exercise. On 28 July,
with hostilities against Germany a strong possibility, Britain’s manned and ready
naval forces were ordered to their war stations. On 4 August, war between Britain and Germany began. Fortuitous preparedness foreclosed the possibility of
naval debacle from surprise attack. With Britain’s first-line naval strength poised
to fight, the stage was set for a full-scale encounter with the German battle fleet.
Many on both sides expected a major battle to take place within days, but the
German navy did not sortie. Subsequent German operational reticence would
keep its main body beyond the reach of British guns
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coast of Denmark. The outcome of the battle of Jutland, however, was inconclusive. In spite of large superiorities in numbers and firepower, moreover, the British battle fleet not only failed to destroy its adversary, but suffered heavier losses.
Historians have attributed the causes of this unsatisfactory result to several factors, including weaknesses in British operational command and Admiralty or1
ganization, and defective materiel. In addition, much has been made of what
can be called British tactical sterility—that is to say, British battle fleet tactics of
the period are portrayed as simple, unimaginative, and, above all, unchanging.
The present article will challenge the conventional portrayal of early British
wartime naval tactical planning by considering the interlocking technical, strategic, operational, and intelligence factors that shaped tactical intent. The examination of the interior mind of Britain’s naval leadership is based on the author’s
recently published findings on prewar British naval tactical planning, and
mainly primary sources covering the war. The inquiry will address the following
three questions: What form did the leadership of the Royal Navy expect a major
fleet action to take, and why? When reality did not correspond to expectations,
how did the leadership of the Royal Navy respond? And finally, what circumstances conditioned the responses? The story to be told is not one of action but
2
of the changing attitudes that informed potential action.
Arthur J. Marder, the author of the standard account of early-twentieth-century
naval policy, depicted a Royal Navy that on the outbreak of war was commanded
3
by admirals who were tactically unprogressive, self-satisfied, and thoughtless.
Marder’s assessment was based upon the memoirs of prominent naval officers
4
and politicians. Such apparently authoritative testimony was, however, corrupted by a combination of partisanship, ignorance, and perhaps fading memory. A considerable body of documentary evidence supports a very different
view of the state of tactical thinking in the Royal Navy in 1914. By this time,
more than a decade of rapid technical development and comprehensive tactical
experiment had provided the basis for two different tactical outlooks. The first
school of thought, which will be called the “agnostic opportunists,” believed that
a future major sea battle with the German navy could take any number of different forms and that the British fleet thus needed to be prepared to operate effectively under a broad range of tactical conditions. The second school of thought,
which will be called the “clandestine preempters,” believed that the Germans
would seek to fight the one kind of naval battle in which they could expect to
achieve major success in spite of their inferiorities in numbers and firepower
and that the British battle fleet should thus develop specific countermeasures in
secret in order to surprise and thereby defeat its opponent under these particular circumstances.
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The agnostic opportunists were centered in the First Fleet of the Home Fleet.
Their titular and spiritual leader was Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, its commander in chief. Callaghan had taken this position in November 1911 and
served until July 1914. The timing and span of Callaghan’s tenure in command
of the Home Fleet is significant. At the beginning of his tour, much fewer than
half of his first-line capital units consisted of all-big-gun battleships; in 1913,
two out of his four battleship squadrons were still made up of the older
predreadnought-type battleships; and in July 1914, the third dreadnought battleship squadron was still at half strength. Dreadnought battleships were much
more heavily armed and faster than their predreadnought stablemates, but the
combination of the two types in a single formation meant that full advantage
could not be taken of the dreadnought’s superior qualities. Callaghan also had to
contend with the fact that gunnery efficiency changed considerably over his
term of office. In 1911, shortcomings in gunnery equipment and technique had
raised serious questions about big-gun effectiveness. While these difficulties
were largely rectified by prototypes of improved materiel and the development
of new methods of firing, as late as July 1914 only half the available dreadnought
battleships were equipped and trained to achieve what was believed to be
state-of-the-art gunnery. The wide disparity in gunnery capability even among
the dreadnought battleships thus further complicated tactical preparation.
Finally, beginning in 1912, the introduction of torpedoes whose range at high
speed was much greater than that of their predecessors greatly increased the vulnerability of the battle line to serious losses from underwater ordnance fired
5
from either enemy battleships or destroyers.
Callaghan was responsible for Britain’s main battle fleet in the event of war,
which could come at any time. His problem insofar as tactical planning was concerned, therefore, was immediate—how to fight with the forces in hand. Given
the combination of difficult circumstances facing him in the moment, Callaghan
appears to have focused his energies on maximizing technical efficiency—that
is, getting each of the differing elements of his command to realize its highest attainable level of combat capability—rather than on formulating a tightly inte6
grated tactical scheme. This loose functional arrangement allowed new ships
and improved equipment and technique to be introduced with minimal disruption of readiness to fight. Tactical coherence, to the degree that it existed, was a
matter of shared attitude in three general areas. In the first place, Callaghan believed that a fleet action would involve considerable sparring at a distance as well
as the possibility of a hammer-and-tongs slugfest at medium and short ranges,
which caused him to order a substantial increase in the amount of ammunition
issued to all dreadnoughts.7 In the second place, Callaghan was by no means
confident that even the latest methods of gunnery were applicable under all the
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various conditions of range and visibility that were likely to occur in a real naval
battle, and he thus insisted that his gunners keep up practice in a variety of
8
methods of gunlaying (that is, pointing) and fire control. In the third place,
Callaghan was convinced that under favorable circumstances destroyers could
sink battleships with torpedoes; as a consequence, he planned to attach substan9
tial flotilla forces to the battle line and use them offensively. A measure of tactical success, if not decisive victory, was to be achieved by a combination of
propitious circumstances and general competence in gunnery and fleet
maneuver.
The clandestine preempters were based at the Admiralty. Their de facto chief
was Vice Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, most of whose career as a flag officer had
been spent at the Admiralty as director of naval ordnance from 1905 to 1907,
Third Sea Lord and controller (that is, overseer of navy materiel procurement)
from 1908 to 1910, and Second Sea Lord (that is, in effect, director of naval personnel) from 1912 to July 1914,
with only short breaks in between
By late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a
with the fleet. While in charge of
long-range engagement to disrupt German
the Admiralty’s technical departintentions but also under the right conditions
to resort to a medium-range fight to achieve a ments as DNO and controller,
Jellicoe had directed the course of
decisive victory.
improvement in gunnery materiel and technique. From late 1911 through mid-1912 he had commanded a
battleship squadron that spent much of its time testing new gunnery equipment
and methods. Where Callaghan’s main concerns about tactical practice were immediate, Jellicoe’s were prospective. For most of the decade that preceded the
outbreak of war, his attention day to day had been devoted to the advancement
of gunnery capability beyond a state of critical imperfection. For years Jellicoe
had struggled with recalcitrant technical problems in gunlaying, fire control,
ordnance, and warship design. Overcoming these difficulties, he believed, was
vital in order to deal with two major threats to Britain’s battle fleet. The first,
which has already been mentioned, was the danger posed by long-range torpedoes. The second, which requires explanation, was what was believed to be the
German intention to fight a medium-range action with a combination of big
guns, quick-firing guns, and torpedoes.
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the state secretary of the Imperial Naval Office
and the driving force behind German naval expansion, was an outspoken proponent of aggressive tactics. Tirpitz, who was responsible for naval administration and shipbuilding, had no control over operations. His views on how the
battle fleet should be used nevertheless shaped British assessments of German
operational intentions. British naval intelligence reported that the Germans
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believed that their fleet would be able to win a decisive battle at medium ranges
(roughly seven to eight thousand yards). The Germans were apparently convinced that their ships would be able to close to medium ranges without suffering significant damage because British gunnery would be thrown off by the
quick change of range during the approach. After closing, the Germans would
turn onto a course parallel to the British line, which would keep the range constant and thus maximize the accuracy of fire. At this point, the German fleet—
with its faster-firing though lighter-caliber big guns, a large superiority in
medium-caliber guns, and battleship torpedo batteries that were twice the size
of their British counterparts—would be capable in theory of inflicting much
greater damage than it would suffer in return in spite of its numerical inferior10
ity. To counter this threat the British fleet either had to develop the capacity to
hit when ranges were long and changing, and thus stop or cripple the German
fleet before it could bring its weapons into action, or devise means to fight and
win a medium-range action without suffering heavy losses from German gunnery and torpedoes. The third possibility, retreat in the face of a German ad11
vance, was rejected as morally unacceptable.
For several years, Jellicoe favored efforts to accomplish the first of the two al12
ternatives, namely, to hit effectively at long ranges that were changing. But in
1912 he concluded that recently adopted and forthcoming new gunnery equipment and methods would not only enable a British battle line to overpower a
German opponent at medium ranges but would do so in a way that neutralized
the torpedo threat. Improved gunlaying and sight-setting equipment promised
a dramatic increase in the Royal Navy’s practical rate of accurate big-gun fire at
short and medium ranges. The introduction of heavier-caliber big guns and
better armor-piercing projectiles would make the more accurate and rapid fire
even more deadly. Also, defensive deployment of all available cruisers and destroyers was to provide the means of stopping at a distance German flotilla attacks on the battle line, whose shooting would thus be undisturbed by
maneuvering to avoid torpedoes. The prospective net gain in firepower was
enormous: with the proper gunnery equipment and well-drilled crews, the British dreadnoughts coming into service from 1912 onward could, when steaming
on a straight course, place more than ten times the weight of projectile on target
than earlier dreadnoughts. This would be enough to shatter the German battle
line in no more than six minutes, which was less time than it took for a
high-speed torpedo to traverse the distance between the opposed forces at medium range. On the assumptions that German gunnery technique was no better
than that of the Royal Navy before 1912, that tight British security had concealed
the improvement in British gunnery, and that accordingly the Germans would
seek a medium-range engagement on parallel courses, the British battle fleet

Published by T:\Academic\NWC
U.S. Naval War College
Digital
Commons,
Review\NWC
Review
Summer2007
2007\Ventura\NWC
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:47 AM

Review Summer 2007.vp

5

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 8
106

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

would be able to deliver an overwhelming hail of fire, after which all ships could
turn simultaneously in response to a single signal to avoid oncoming torpedoes.
Following this turn, the line could be reformed by a second signal, which would
be made in the absence of firing and thus under conditions that favored accurate
13
transmission and receipt of the order.
Jellicoe’s scheme must have been attractive for several reasons. The agnostic
opportunists envisioned a battle of complex offensive maneuver by battleships,
cruisers, and destroyers. Coordinating such an action required a very high degree of tactical skill throughout the fleet, as well as complicated signaling. Tactical errors by subordinate commanders or breakdowns in communications
would produce at the very least some confusion, at worst complete disorganization, which would open the possibility of defeat in detail. Even if order was
maintained, British gun crews that had been trained to fire at long as well as medium ranges might lack the practiced skill required to outshoot or even match
opponents who had concentrated all their energy on maximizing speed and accuracy at medium range. If the British battle line stayed on the same course for
much longer than six minutes at medium range, it was likely to suffer heavily
from torpedoes as well as gunfire. The program of the clandestine preempters, in
contrast, called for offensive action by battleships that did not maneuver, with
cruisers and destroyers providing a defensive screen; that approach posed relatively simpler command and control problems, called for gunnery methods that
would give the British battle line firepower superiority under the very tactical
conditions that would be sought by their German opponents, and offered a remedy to the torpedo threat.
A consensus within the Admiralty in favor of Jellicoe’s tactical scheme appears to have been formed in late 1912. Because German cognizance of the Royal
Navy’s plan and the capabilities upon which it was based would compromise its
effectiveness, knowledge of its existence was restricted to a select few. Keeping
the plan secret was made easier by the fact that the British fleet was ill prepared
to execute it. By mid-1913, only one battleship squadron out of the four in the
First Fleet of the Home Fleet was made up of ships suitable to fight the kind of
medium-range battle envisioned by Jellicoe. But ships under construction that
would come into service in the next two years could be formed into a second
squadron, while the older, less heavily armed dreadnought battleships could be
given the new sight-setting equipment, which would enhance significantly their
ability to shoot accurately and rapidly at medium ranges. In the spring of 1914,
Jellicoe was informed that he would succeed Callaghan as commander in chief
of the Home Fleet at the end of the year. By this time, the Home Fleet would be
only a few months away from having a second full squadron of battleships fitted
with state-of-the-art gunlaying and sight-setting equipment and armed for the
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most part with big guns that were much larger than those in the German fleet.
The remaining dreadnoughts would, had the war not begun in August, most
14
likely have been fitted with the new sight-setting equipment; only one squadron would have been made up of predreadnoughts. With all that brought to fruition and three-quarters of the battle fleet thus more or less appropriately
equipped, Jellicoe would have commanded a force with a credible capacity to execute his vision of decisive battle at medium range.
By the spring of 1914, the British view of a medium-range engagement had
been broadened to include the possibility of an engagement between two lines of
battleships on parallel courses but moving in opposite directions. Little attention
had been given to this contingency until Captain William Wordsworth Fisher,
commander of the dreadnought battleship St. Vincent, submitted a memorandum on the subject to Callaghan in April 1914. Callaghan observed that “action
on opposite courses at medium range will afford excellent opportunities for long
range torpedo fire.” This was because the opposed fleets would be advancing rapidly toward torpedoes launched by their opponent, which meant that the distance
the torpedo had traveled by the point of impact would be much less than the range
to the target had been at the point of firing. The threat of torpedoes under the circumstances described could not “be eliminated short of leading the van out of
torpedo range,” which “might be impossible without exposing the rear to the fire
of a larger number of enemy ships.” That being said, Callaghan believed that superior British gunfire would be capable of rendering the enemy battleships incapable of either effective gunfire or torpedo attack, although he did not mention the
greater difficulty of aiming guns when the change-of-range rate was high, as
would be the case when fleets were steaming on opposed courses. He was convinced, moreover, that such an action would give the British forces an opportunity
to smash the leading ships of the German battle line and thus disrupt the entire
enemy formation. Callaghan concluded that battle on opposite courses was possible either in the form of a meeting engagement in bad weather or in good weather
through deliberate action (for unspecified reasons). What Callaghan may have
had in mind was the transformation of a pursuit action into a battle on opposite
courses by a simultaneous turn by a retreating German fleet, whose motive was to
15
maximize the effectiveness of its superior torpedo armament.
The orderly transition from one tactical regime to another that was planned
for late 1914 was disrupted by the decision of the Admiralty in the last week of
July to replace Callaghan with Jellicoe immediately in the likely event of war
with Germany. Jellicoe objected strenuously to this ruling, and with cause. He
could not fight the kind of battle that he wanted with the fleet that existed. If a
major engagement against the German navy was to be fought in the near term, it
would have to be executed along the lines worked on by Callaghan, in which case
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the incumbent admiral, with two years’ experience in office and the confidence
of his subordinates, was the better choice. Winston Churchill, the First Lord, rejected Jellicoe’s demurrals, however, and Jellicoe reluctantly accepted the ap16
pointment, which became effective on 4 August, the day war was declared. On
this date he took command of the first-line fighting ships of the Home Fleet, a
force that was designated the Grand Fleet. The Admiralty’s reasoning is still mysterious. It may well be that Britain’s naval leadership believed that the Germans
would keep their navy in port during the early months of the war and that
Jellicoe, as the leader of the clandestine preempters, was the best man to use the
time to prepare the just-mobilized battle fleet to achieve a decisive victory along
the lines formulated in 1912. In any case, German operational reticence, compounded by British operational caution, practically eliminated the possibility of
a major fleet action in the fall of 1914.
Although Tirpitz called for the immediate offensive deployment of the battle
fleet, he was unable to persuade the operational leadership of the German navy
to risk a major clash prior to the reduction of the Grand Fleet’s numerical ad17
vantage by the action of German destroyers, submarines, and mines. Conversely, Jellicoe feared that British losses to those threats would set the stage for a
German sortie to fight a battle at medium range, the outcome of which might
18
well be unfavorable, given yet-to-be rectified materiel shortcomings. He thus
instructed his command in August and September that he would exercise caution when threatened by torpedo attack or mines, even to the point of giving up
what appeared to be opportunities for decisive action. In contrast to Callaghan,
Jellicoe made it clear that the primary function of destroyers was to prevent or
disrupt enemy destroyer attacks on the battle line. Jellicoe stated a general intention to fight at what could be called “very high medium range”—that is, nine to
twelve thousand yards. But he also warned that “it may be necessary to close the
range or otherwise maneuver the fleet to avoid indecisive action.” Nevertheless,
Jellicoe called for deliberate shooting at ranges that were well above ten thousand yards, in the hopes of throwing the German fleet “into partial confusion
before its attack can be developed, with consequent loss of initiative and inter19
ference with their prearranged plan [i.e., closing to medium range].”
In October, Jellicoe expressed these same views to the Admiralty, after which he
declared his intention to “pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper
course to defeat and annihilate the enemy’s battle fleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism.”20 The short-term prospects of achieving this objective, however, were not good. In October, the Grand Fleet lost one of its
dreadnought battleships to a mine, three more were crippled by engine defects,
and a fifth was in dock refitting. All five vessels, moreover, were of the latest type,
which thus cut the battleship force capable of using the new methods of gunnery
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to full effect by half. In November, yet another first-class dreadnought battleship
was disabled by engine trouble, and in December two others (including one of the
units that had suffered engine problems in October) were damaged by collision.
These losses were mitigated by the addition of four new battleships, which required, however, some months to work up to the same standards of efficiency as
21
older units. Thus the Grand Fleet’s ability—measured in battleships of the appropriate kind and level of effectiveness—to fight a medium-range engagement
effectively was even less during the last three months of 1914 than it had been at
the beginning of the war. In late December, indeed, the Second Battle Squadron—
the only unit that was fully equipped and trained to execute Jellicoe’s tactical
ideas—was at half strength (see table). These circumstances were exacerbated by a
severe shortage of destroyers. In early December, Jellicoe reported that in view of
COMPOSITION OF BRITISH BATTLE SQUADRONS IN TERMS OF GUNNERY EFFECTIVENESS AT
MEDIUM RANGE, AUGUST 1914–JANUARY 1916
Actual Late
November 1914

Actual Late
December 1914

Actual Late
January 1915

Nominal
January 1915

Nominal
January 1916

1A

1A

1A

1A

1A

1A

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

5C

4C

5C

4C

5C

5 C+

2nd Battle
Squadron

8A

7A

4A

6A

8A

8A

3rd Battle
Squadron

8D

7D

7D

6D

8D

7D

4th Battle
Squadron

1A

1 A/1 A-

2 A/2 A-

3A

4A

4A

1 B-

1B

1B

1B

1B

1B

3C

3C

3C

3C

3C

3 C+

*

*

*

*

3A

9 A/1 A-

7 A/2 A-

10 A

13 A

16 A

3B

3B

3B

3B

3B

7C

8C

7C

8C

8 C+

7D

7D

6D

8D

7D

12

10

13

16

27

Units

Actual Early
August 1914

1st Battle
Squadron

5th Battle
Squadron

*
10 A
2B

Total by Category

1 B8C
8D

Total Effective
Units [A, B, C+]
at Medium
Range

12

LEGEND
Maximum effectiveness [proper guns, mountings, fire control] = A
Maximum effectiveness but not worked up = AHigh effectiveness [proper mountings, fire control] = B
High effectiveness but not worked up = BGood effectiveness [proper fire control] = C+
Poor effectiveness [lack of proper guns, mountings, fire control] = C
Very poor effectiveness [predreadnought] = D
Note: C units were probably being upgraded to C+ as they refitted from the fall of 1914 through 1915. Actual figures take into account ships under repair or refit. Nominal figures do not.
Sources: F. J. Dittmar and J. J. Colledge, British Warships 1914–1919 (London: Ian Allan, 1972), pp. 15–19; Jellicoe, Grand Fleet, pp. 168, 185, 199.
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the more than two-to-one superiority in destroyer numbers enjoyed by the Germans, he would have no choice but to “adopt the objectionable and difficult one
of turning the battle fleet away when the attack takes place.” This, he observed,
22
would upset gunfire and possibly forfeit “a position of tactical advantage.”
During the first five months of the war, the German navy’s decision to confine
its operations to battle-cruiser raids and forays with submarines and light surface craft while keeping the battle fleet back meant that the Grand Fleet’s weaknesses with respect to a medium-range battle did not matter. The Admiralty,
however, did not believe that German operational diffidence would last. By as
early as October 1914, according to the official history of the Royal Navy, Britain’s naval leadership had concluded that the Germans would
husband their fleet for some sudden blow when the long winter nights would give
them the best chance of evasion and surprise. Now that their failures in France had
forced them to recognize that the war would not be the short and brilliant affair they
had expected, they were already having to give anxious attention to the question of
food supply, and however prudently inclined the High Command of the navy might
be, its hand might at any time be forced into some desperate attempt to diminish the
stringency of the blockade, or to deter us from sending further troops to France.23

By early 1915, the Grand Fleet’s ability to fight a medium-range engagement
had improved significantly, for several reasons. First, the four new battleships
had completed their workups and could be considered fully effective. Second, by
late 1914, British naval signals intelligence was able to give warning of German
warship movements, which enabled Jellicoe to reduce the time spent at sea in anticipation of enemy activity, with the result that the crippling loss rate of the pre24
vious fall from engine wear decreased substantially. Third, the ability of
perhaps at least a few of the older dreadnoughts to fight at medium ranges had
been much improved by new-model fire control equipment, the fitting of which
25
had been given a high priority after the outbreak of war; as a consequence, the
Grand Fleet from January 1915 onward almost certainly had available a significantly greater number of all-big-gun battleships that were more or less equipped
to hit hard and rapidly at medium ranges than it had had in late 1914 (see table).
Fourth, destroyer reinforcements to the Grand Fleet substantially reduced the
26
German advantage in this category of warship.
On 12 January 1915, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, informed
Jellicoe that there was “some ‘movement’ going on in the German High Seas
27
Fleet—nothing at all definite, but nevertheless enough to arouse suspicion.”
The Admiralty also had good reason to believe that when the Germans acted,
they would seek a medium-range engagement. Notice to the Grand Fleet was
given in the form of a complete translation of a recent redaction of the German
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28

Tactical Orders, which was taken seriously by Jellicoe. This pamphlet, which
was printed for distribution in January 1915, stated that German battleships
would close to fight at ranges of 8,800 to 6,600 yards, that torpedoes would be
29
fired at this range, and that decisive victory at any cost was the objective.
Jellicoe may also have been influenced by intelligence reports indicating that the
German battle fleet had devoted considerable time to practicing rapid course re30
versals through simultaneous turns; that could have indicated a German inten31
tion to transform a retreat into a medium-range battle on opposite courses.
The Second Battle Squadron was best equipped to deal with the high and varying change-of-range rates that would characterize such conditions; for this and
other reasons it may have been designated to lead the fleet into battle, as was to
be the case at Jutland.32
Jellicoe seems to have responded with an instruction to the Grand Fleet prescribing methods of gunnery that were suitable for a medium-range battle and
conversely discouraging the use of director firing, a centralized system of aiming
all the guns of the main battery of a capital ship, which was essential for accurate
33
shooting at long range. Moreover, Jellicoe stressed not only the general importance of fast firing but its specific importance with respect to those battleships
that were best equipped to carry it out. This instruction, dated 18 January 1915,
stated that
experience has shown that under really favourable conditions firing by direct
gunlaying is superior to director firing both as regards rapidity and accuracy of fire,
markedly so in the matter of rapidity in ships fitted with quick elevating valves and
presses [to train, elevate, and depress the gun barrels], as are the latest ships, if there
is an awkward yaw [lateral motion of the ship’s bow] and roll. . . . The fact is that in a
turret ship the director is in some respects more difficult to handle well than is a gun,
and therefore an awkward motion, yaw, turns, particularly with a second-rate director layer, often results in inaccurate or a reduced rate of fire. . . . It cannot be too
strongly emphasized that volume of accurate fire is the object to be aimed at—the
ship which first succeeds in hitting hard gets halfway to victory. We know the Germans shoot well, no one doubts that the advantage of early hits is thoroughly appreciated by them, and that they will do their utmost to develop initial superiority of fire
by rapidity, which as our guns are more powerful, is their only chance of succeeding.
. . . It follows, therefore, that our system must be that which, under the condition existing at the time, will enable the highest rate of accurate fire to be developed.34

In February 1915, following the tactical victory of the British battle cruisers
under the command of Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty over their German counterparts at Dogger Bank, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the commander of the
German battle fleet, was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. During the first
two weeks of March, the combination of signals intelligence and this change in
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leadership prompted the Admiralty to warn Jellicoe of a possible German battle
35
fleet sortie. In the meanwhile, the Grand Fleet conducted gunnery exercises
36
replicating the conditions of a medium-range fight. An exercise of 9 March envisioned an action in which a fleet that “desires to engage at long range” was opposed by one that “desires to close to 11,000 yards or less.” The exercise of 12
March involved a battle in which visibility was assumed to be only ten thousand
37
yards. Following these experiments, Jellicoe added a gunnery addendum to the
Grand Fleet Battle Orders on 20 March 1915. “At all ranges,” he declared, “the
early development of accurate rapid fire is the object to be kept in view.” Jellicoe
made clear that he expected gunners to resort to rapid independent fire, a
method of shooting that was most effective at medium ranges, as well as rapid
salvos. Also, given the likelihood
Tabletop war games in the battleship Benbow that the poor visibility conditions
typical of the North Sea might reexplored an engagement between the British
and German battle fleets at eighteen thousand strict shooting to medium ranges,
he insisted that “ships must be
yards.
prepared to open rapid fire from
38
the outset in order to make sure of establishing initial superiority.” Jellicoe’s
misgivings about director gunnery were also still in evidence in the late spring.
On 20 April, Jellicoe discouraged the use of directors improvised because of delays in the supply of factory models “except under conditions when the ordinary
method of firing [that is, direct laying, in which each turret’s crew aimed its own
39
guns] cannot be employed.” It is, he observed on 27 May, “more difficult to handle
40
a director well than it is to lay a gun.”
British expectations that the Germans would seek a decisive fleet action
peaked in April. “In my view,” Fisher wrote to Churchill, the First Lord, on 31
March, “there are many indications—of which the recent cruise of the German
Fleet is an example—that under their new Commander-in-Chief we may anticipate a more forward and aggressive policy in the North Sea, and therefore we
41
must be prepared for all eventualities.” In mid-April, the crisis seemed to have
arrived. On 15 April, Fisher warned Jellicoe that “VON POHL HAS SOMETHING
42
ON! That is quite certain!” The next day, Fisher wrote, “Von Pohl is assuredly up
43
to something.” The Germans, however, aborted their deployment. “We really
thought,” Fisher confided to Jellicoe on 17 April, “the battle would be joined
to-day! Everything pointed to it. . . . They had arranged not to return till dawn of
[the] 19th or night of [the] 19th, and suddenly a very urgent and immediate or44
der [was] given for the whole Fleet to return home.” A second scare followed a
week later, but again the German fleet withdrew to its base after staying well be45
yond the reach of Jellicoe’s forces. These events convinced Fisher that a battle
fleet showdown with the Germans was unlikely. There would, he declared to
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Jellicoe on 23 April, “NEVER be a battle with the German High Seas Fleet unless
von Pohl goes north specially to fight you, and that he never will! That’s the situa46
tion and you can’t alter it!”
There remained the possibility that luck or good intelligence would enable
Jellicoe to intercept the German battle fleet, which might then be engaged at a
distance as it attempted to withdraw. As early as 2 April, the Grand Fleet carried
47
out a gunnery exercise in which battleships fired at sixteen thousand yards. It
should be noted, however, that Jellicoe restricted ships whose gun crews had not
been fully worked up to methods of firing best suited to a medium-range fight, a
decision implying that mastery of these techniques had priority over those
48
needed for effective gunnery at long range. Gunnery exercises on 6 June were
carried out at no more than twelve thousand yards, and perhaps less, with appar49
ently good results. Jellicoe thus informed Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the First
Sea Lord, on 16 June, “If only we could get our chance to finish off the High Seas
50
Fleet now, I feel we are in the pink of condition. But we must exercise patience.”
In late June, tabletop war games in the battleship Benbow explored the nature of
an engagement between the British and German battle fleets at eighteen thou51
sand yards, with the former in pursuit of the latter. There are no records of the
proceedings, but on 23 June 1915 Jellicoe informed Beatty that the participants
52
had “certainly learned lessons.” In early August, the Grand Fleet carried out
gunnery exercises that involved shooting at seventeen thousand yards for newer
dreadnoughts and twelve thousand for the older units, whose main-battery guns
53
were smaller. This was followed in early September by an exercise at sea that
54
dealt with the case of a retiring German fleet.
Firing at extended ranges, where the percentage of hits to rounds fired would
be low and thus quick decisions would be improbable, meant that pursuit, even
if successful, would be protracted. This would give the Germans ample opportunity to launch attacks with their destroyers and possibly even to maneuver in
55
ways that would draw the Grand Fleet into a minefield or submarine ambush.
Arthur James Balfour, Churchill’s successor as First Lord, advised Jellicoe that he
was convinced that the problem posed by a German retreat covered by mines
and submarines was insoluble. Jellicoe, in his reply of 10 July, did not answer his
chief ’s concerns directly but did make it clear that he would never advance with56
out a full destroyer screen.
Given his record of caution and recent declaration of prudent conduct in the
face of threats from underwater ordnance, Jellicoe must have been surprised and
offended by a suggestion from Beatty in early August that the Grand Fleet had
focused on the use of heavy guns to the point of denying the powers of the mine
and torpedo their due. This provoked a strong response from Jellicoe on 7 August. He insisted that he had been “most fully alive, ever since the war began, to
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the extremely important part which mines and submarines are likely to play in
57
the fleet action, if fought where the Germans want it.” At the same time, Jellicoe
categorically rejected the charge that the Grand Fleet was “obsessed with the
idea . . . that we place reliance in our guns alone,” insisting that indeed some
58
members of his command placed “too little reliance on the gun.” Given the
German numerical superiority in destroyers, Jellicoe believed he had no choice
but to deploy his own flotilla defensively, which meant that decisive victory, if it
was to be had at all, would have to be produced by the action of heavy gunnery.
Beatty, in his reply to what he regarded as a rebuke for perceived defeatism, conceded on 12 August that the Grand Fleet’s gunnery advantage was “at present . . .
our only asset” and endorsed the proposition that “decisive victory is the only
thing to aim at.”59
Looking to effective gunnery as the main source of decisive victory, however,
raised difficult issues. In September 1915, Frederic Dreyer, the captain of a battleship in the Second Battle Squadron and Jellicoe’s chief gunnery adviser, observed that the “experience of the War must have shown the Germans that they
have little or no hope in clear weather of getting their Battle Line to so close a
range as 8,800 to 6,000 yards from the Grand Fleet.” Dreyer argued that British
rangefinders and associated fire control equipment could in clear weather produce “excellent results” at up to fifteen thousand yards and “good results” from
60
fifteen to seventeen thousand yards. But poor weather conditions in the North
Sea limited visibility more often than not, and in any case the rate of hitting from
above ten thousand yards was far less, even under ideal conditions, than it was at
seven to nine thousand. This meant that British ships would require a much longer time to inflict heavy damage while steaming on a straight course than in a
medium-range engagement, which would expose them to torpedoes fired by
German battleships or destroyers. German torpedoes at their high-speed setting
had a maximum range of roughly ten thousand yards. Dreyer thus argued that
the British battle line should maintain a distance of 13,500 yards from German
battleships and accompanying destroyers, which was far enough to avoid torpedoes from the former and allow defensive action by British cruisers and destroyers against the latter. Should the British screening units fail to intercept the attacking German flotilla, Dreyer insisted that the Grand Fleet “must turn away . . . even
if this means losing the High Sea [sic] Fleet (better than losing the Grand Fleet).”
Dreyer concluded, “If we deployed at 18,000 yards in very clear weather we
should, with our superior Fleet speed, be able to close in to 13,500 yards with all
guns bearing . . . —before Fire is ordered to be opened at about 15,000 yards—
61
unless the Germans open fire before we arrive at that range.”
Dreyer’s counsel, which by his own admission represented a compromise between countering the torpedo threat and meeting the requirements of gunnery,
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offered little hope of decisive results. Commander Roger Backhouse, a member
of Jellicoe’s staff, believed, on one hand, that 13,500 yards was too low to ensure
security against German destroyers, while on the other hand, he was convinced
that assuming the German flotilla threat could be neutralized the fighting range
should be from ten to twelve thousand yards. This, he argued, would allow deci62
sive results to be obtained in good time. Jellicoe, for his part, had no alternative
but to accept action that would most likely have to take place at ranges considerably greater than those at which his main batteries could hit consistently. Although the documentary record is sparse for the fall of 1915, it appears that
gunnery exercises in October and later were for the most part carried out at
63
ranges above fifteen thousand yards. By this time, long-range hitting capability
had been greatly improved by the fitting of directors in the majority of the
64
dreadnought battleships. That being said, continued belief in the possibility of
a medium-range engagement seems to have prompted a test of the Grand Fleet’s
capacity to shoot accurately with methods of fire control that facilitated high
rates of shooting. This exercise, which took place in late December, was appar65
ently reassuring.
The general revised edition of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders of December
1915 established rules of engagement that balanced the views of both Dreyer
and Backhouse. “In weather of good visibility,” Jellicoe maintained, “the range
should be between 15,000 and 10,000 yards; the later being reached as the enemy’s fire is overcome; in the early stages of action I do not desire to close the
66
range much inside 14,000 yards.” The torpedo threat was to be avoided by
keeping the range long. “The torpedo menace,” Jellicoe warned,
must always be borne in mind. . . . Until the enemy is beaten by gunfire it is not my
intention to risk attack from his torpedoes, although [it] is always possible that if we
were inferior in strength on meeting it might become necessary to close sufficiently
to attack by torpedoes. Such a movement would, however, be ordered by me, and
generally speaking it is to be understood that my intention is to keep outside torpedo
range of the enemy’s battle line.67

Jellicoe made it clear, as he had in his instructions of August 1914, that effective long-range shooting was important in order to disrupt German deployment
68
for a medium-range engagement. Nonetheless, Jellicoe added to the orders a
section declaring that circumstances could arise in which the leading squadron
would be “gradually closing with a view to obtaining decisive results with gunfire and for the purpose of firing their torpedoes, but not being followed to that
69
closer range by our center or rear.” Here again Jellicoe may have been thinking
specifically of the Second Battle Squadron, at this date still the only squadron
of the Grand Fleet made up completely of ships with heavier main batteries

Published by T:\Academic\NWC
U.S. Naval War College
Digital
Commons,
Review\NWC
Review
Summer2007
2007\Ventura\NWC
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:48 AM

Review Summer 2007.vp

15

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 8
116

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and, with one exception, the latest fire control equipment (see table and note
32), and which would, as noted, be deployed in the lead at the battle of Jutland in
1916.
It would thus appear that by late 1915 Jellicoe had decided to fight a
long-range engagement to disrupt German intentions of fighting at medium
range with both their battleships and flotillas, but also under the right conditions to resort to a medium-range fight with his best squadron to achieve a decisive victory. The fact that a medium-range battle was still considered a serious
possibility would explain why the revised edition of the Royal Navy’s Manual of
Gunnery, which was released in January 1916, covered fire control methods and
gunlaying practices that were appropriate to a medium-range as well as
70
long-range battle. Also, Jellicoe at
The British dreadnoughts coming into service
this point probably had reasons to
from 1912 onward could place more than ten
believe that the German battle
times the weight of projectile on target than
fleet might seek action in the near
earlier dreadnoughts.
future. The Germans’ abandonment of their unrestricted submarine campaign against merchant shipping in September 1915, after the objection
of neutral powers, most likely prompted some expectation of compensatory aggressive action by the surface fleet. The onset of the second winter of the war may
also, as in the year before, have given rise to the belief that the Germans would exploit bad weather and poor visibility to conduct battle fleet operations. Finally,
British intelligence may have learned of the bitter dissent in Germany between
71
proponents of action and advocates of caution in the government and fleet.
By the spring of 1916, the inactivity of the German battle fleet through the
very season that in theory most favored the success of an inferior force had at last
convinced the leaders of the Grand Fleet that decisive battle was unobtainable.
Queried by Jellicoe on the issue, Beatty replied on 14 April 1916, “I think the
German Fleet will come out only on its own initiative when the right time comes,”
by which he meant a sortie to engage an inferior British force. “I am firmly convinced,” Beatty added, “that under no circumstances could we ever by taking the
initiative induce them to commit themselves to an action which in any way
72
could be considered decisive.” Two days before, Jellicoe had informed Admiral
Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, that all the important strategic benefits of
destroying the German battle fleet were being achieved by its confinement to
harbor. For this reason, Jellicoe argued, “it is not, in my opinion, wise to risk unduly the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet in an attempt to hasten the end of the
High Seas Fleet, particularly if the risks come, not from the High Seas Fleet itself,
73
but from such attributes as mines and submarines.” The balance of his letter
was devoted to examining the chances of attacking the German battle fleet in its
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harbors or home waters with aircraft and mines. The prospects for achieving
74
major success with such operations, Jellicoe concluded, were not good.
The belief that the Germans would sooner or later seek a decisive engagement at
medium range largely determined the character of British tactical thinking
about a battle fleet action in the North Sea during the first twenty months of the
war. British tactical preparation during this period went through four stages.
From August to December 1914, the Grand Fleet lacked the material means for
the decisive victory at medium range envisioned by the clandestine preempters
prior to hostilities. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander in chief of the Grand
Fleet and the leader of the clandestine preempters, was thus compelled to adopt
a cautious battle plan based upon fighting at long range, which made a decisive
action in the near term unlikely. From January to May 1915 the Grand Fleet’s
ability to fight the medium-range action called for by the clandestine
preempters before the war was improved significantly by the commissioning of
new battleships, reduced losses from mechanical defects, modernization of
older units, and destroyer reinforcements. During this time, Jellicoe welcomed
the prospect of a head-to-head encounter with the German battle fleet, and he
was probably prepared to commit his command to a medium-range battle in order to achieve a decisive victory. German refusal to challenge British control of
the North Sea with their battle fleet, however, forced Jellicoe to modify his tactical planning. From June through October 1915 the Grand Fleet conducted a series of gunnery and tactical experiments to explore the possibilities of fighting a
long-range action against a German opponent who was unwilling to fight at medium range, while simultaneously maintaining the capacity to fight a mediumrange battle in the event of a German change of heart or a meeting engagement
in poor visibility. From November 1915 to April 1916, the Grand Fleet was more
or less prepared to fight either a medium-range or a long-range engagement depending on circumstances, adopting what was to a degree the approach of the
agnostic opportunists.
Six assessments can be made on the basis of the foregoing analytical summary. First, British tactical preparations before and during the war were driven
by the need to address the threat posed by a specific enemy whose tactical intentions were highly dangerous. Second, during the war, British tactical practice
altered when the German navy did not behave as expected, which is to say that in
spite of the lack of a major battle, British tactical thought was dynamic, not
static. Third, the development and maintenance of the capability to outfight the
German battle fleet at medium range was the primary objective of British tactical preparation up to the end of 1915, and probably through the spring of 1916;
meeting the requirements of a long-range action took second place, which may
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explain the defects in British gunnery at long range eventually exposed by the
battle of Jutland. Fourth, the response of the clandestine preempters to the
threat posed by a German fleet determined to fight a medium-range engagement was well advised, because the German navy’s operational leadership might
have decided to heed Tirpitz’s call for a naval offensive, in which case a British
battle fleet unprepared to fight at medium range could have been roughly handled, if not defeated. Fifth, the fact that the British battle fleet was ill prepared to
fight a medium-range action in the first five months of the war suggests that
Tirpitz’s argument for the aggressive deployment of the German battle fleet had
more in its favor than has previously been supposed. Sixth and finally, given the
effort invested in developing and maintaining the ability to fight effectively at
medium range, it seems likely that had the opportunity presented itself at the battle
of Jutland, Jellicoe would have reached for decisive victory through a mediumrange fight.
The story of Britain’s naval “agnostic opportunists” and “clandestine
preempters” in the early twentieth century illustrates what might be described as
the fundamental dilemma of operational planning. On the one hand, belief that
future hostilities will pose a range of different circumstances can promote preparation of the armed forces for a diverse set of actions, with the drawback that
the consequent division of effort with respect to both equipment and training
will preclude the achievement of levels of tactical proficiency needed to achieve
decisive victory. On the other, the conviction that the future is predictable can
lead to the preparation of the armed forces to fight one kind of engagement, but
at the risk that such a course will produce serious or even critical weaknesses
should events transpire differently than had been anticipated. Choice of operational approach, in other words, is a matter of having to consider the advantages
and drawbacks of two problematical alternatives. This policy quandary might be
expressed in terms of the opposition of two well-known maxims, Jomini’s insistence upon concentration of force as the basis of all military success, and Voltaire’s
observation that “the best is the enemy of the good.”
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